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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2859 
 ___________ 
 
 STEPHEN MATHIES, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 SETH SILVER; MARIA MARTINEZ 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-02882) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
 ____________________________________ 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 8, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, FISHER AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: November 9, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Stephen Mathies, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in 
Phoenix, Arizona, appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint 
filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order 
dismissing Mathies’ complaint against Dr. Seth Silver. 
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I 
 In 2004, Mathies filed in the District Court a Bivens action alleging that Dr. 
Silver, an orthopedic surgeon who repaired Mathies’ injured Achilles tendon in 2001, 
failed to provide adequate follow-up care, and that Maria Martinez, a nurse practitioner at 
the prison in which Mathies was previously incarcerated, denied him immediate access to 
a doctor when his wound became infected.   
 In September 2005, the District Court forwarded blank summonses to Mathies so 
that he could serve the defendants.  Thereafter, the District Court granted Mathies two 
extensions of time to effectuate service.  In the District Court’s second order granting him 
an extension, the District Court explained the service requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4, specifically noting that:  (1) Mathies could not serve Martinez or 
Silver by certified mail; (2) Mathies was also required to serve the United States pursuant 
to Rule 4(i); and (3) all summonses had to be signed and sealed by the Clerk of Court. 
 In May 2006, Mathies wrote to the District Court claiming to have completed 
service on the defendants.  Mathies enclosed certified mail receipts addressed to the 
Attorney General and to the United States Attorney’s Office in Camden, New Jersey, as 
well as an unsigned summons.  In June 2006, the time that the District Court had allotted 
for Mathies to complete service expired, and Martinez filed a motion to dismiss.  The 
District Court granted that motion, reasoning that Mathies failed to properly serve 
Martinez or the United States, and that Mathies had failed to demonstrate good cause to 
warrant an additional opportunity to complete service.  Mathies timely appealed that 
order. 
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 Shortly thereafter, the District Court sua sponte dismissed Mathies’ complaint 
against Silver without prejudice for failure to prosecute, pursuant to District of New 
Jersey Local Rule 41.1(a).1
 We affirmed the District Court’s order granting Martinez’s motion to dismiss on 
the ground that Mathies had failed to serve Martinez with a complete summons.  See 
Mathies v. Silver, 266 F. App’x 138, 140 (3d Cir. 2008).  However, we did not address 
the District Court’s decision as it pertained to Mathies’ failure to properly serve the 
United States.  Further, we vacated the District Court’s order dismissing Mathies’ claims 
against Silver because the District Court did not address Mathies’ statement in opposition 
to dismissal or evaluate the factors a court should consider in determining whether to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute, as set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). 
  Mathies appealed that order, as well, and his two appeals 
were consolidated.   
 On remand, Mathies requested pro bono counsel and, in January 2009, the District 
Court appointed William Tambussi to represent him.  Tambussi filed a formal appearance 
two months later.  In January 2010, Mathies wrote the District Court, complaining that he 
had not heard from Tambussi for an entire year.  The District Court forwarded the letter 
to Tambussi, who did not respond.  In June 2010, Mathies again wrote the District Court 
that he had not heard from counsel.  The District Court noticed the case for dismissal and 
                                                 
1  We noted on appeal that “[t]he District Court’s dismissal was essentially with 
prejudice because the statute of limitations appears to have run on Mathies’ claims.”  
Mathies v. Silver, 266 F. App’x 138, 139 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
4 
 
once again forwarded Mathies’ letter to Tambussi, who responded, explaining that he had 
been unable to contact Mathies in prison and that he had contacted the prison to arrange a 
meeting.  On July 19, 2010, Tambussi met with Mathies at the prison and, on the 
following day -- more than eighteen months after his appointment -- Tambussi filed in the 
District Court a request for the issuance of a summons for Dr. Silver.  The summons was 
issued and Dr. Silver was served on July 20, 2010. 
 Counsel for Dr. Silver entered an appearance and filed a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), (5), and (6), as well as Rule 4(m).  
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Mathies failed to 
properly serve the United States, as required by Rule 4(i), and that Mathies failed to 
demonstrate good cause for his failure to effectuate service.  Mathies timely appealed that 
decision. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A plaintiff to a civil action in 
federal court must complete service of his complaint within 120 days of filing or within a 
period prescribed by the District Court.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).  If the plaintiff fails to 
complete service within the specified time, Rule 4(m) requires the District Court to 
determine whether the plaintiff has shown good cause for the failure.  See Boley v. 
Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir. 1997).  If so, the District Court must grant an 
extension to effect service; if not, the District Court may either dismiss the complaint or 
grant a discretionary extension.  See id.  We review both the District Court’s assessment 
of good cause and its decision not to grant an extension for abuse of discretion.  See id. at 
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758-59. 
 Rule 4(i)(3) requires that a plaintiff suing a federal employee in his individual 
capacity also serve the United States, which is accomplished by delivering a copy of the 
summons2
 “We have equated good cause with the concept of excusable neglect . . . , which 
 and the complaint by certified mail to:  (1) the civil-process clerk at the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the district in which the action was brought, and (2) the 
Attorney General of the United States in Washington, DC.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(1).  
Because Bivens only authorizes suits against federal officials in their individual 
capacities, see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994), Mathies was required to 
complete service pursuant to Rule (4)(i)(3); see also Kurzberg v. Ashcroft, 619 F.3d 176, 
178 (2d Cir. 2010) (Bivens plaintiffs must serve process on both the individual 
defendants and the United States).  Failure to effect service on the United States is 
grounds for a motion to dismiss in a Bivens action.  See Kurzberg, 619 F.3d at 178-79.  
Although the record shows that Mathies attempted in 2006 to send his complaint to the 
Attorney General and United States Attorney, he failed to show that he also sent copies of 
signed, sealed summonses.  And the record reflects no attempt by Mathies’ appointed 
counsel to effect service on the United States.  Thus, it is clear that even after six years, 
multiple extensions, and the appointment of counsel to assist him, Mathies did not 
properly serve the United States, and his complaint against Silver was subject to 
dismissal unless he demonstrated good cause for his failure to do so. 
                                                 
2  As noted above, to satisfy Rule 4, a summons must, inter alia, be signed by the clerk 
and bear the court’s seal.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1). 
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requires a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement 
and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified in the rules.”  
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  The factors a court should consider in evaluating 
whether good cause exists are:  (1) the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s efforts to effect 
service; (2) prejudice to the defendant because of untimely service; (3) whether the 
plaintiff has moved for an enlargement of time; and (4) whether the statute of limitations 
will bar the plaintiff’s claims if the action is dismissed.  See id. at 1097-98.  In 
concluding that Mathies had not shown good cause to excuse his failure to complete 
service, the District Court noted the various extensions and accommodations Mathies was 
afforded, both before and after Tambussi was appointed to represent him, and explained 
that, despite the assistance he received, Mathies failed to serve Dr. Silver with a 
complaint for more than six years and never properly served the United States.  Further, 
we note that Tambussi’s brief opposing the motion to dismiss made much of Mathies’ 
good faith efforts and pro se status -- which the District Court gave due consideration to -
- but failed to acknowledge Tambussi’s own failure to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 4(i).  We presume that Tambussi was able to review the complete record of 
proceedings, which clearly demonstrated both that Mathies was required to serve the 
United States and that he had not adequately done so.  That Tambussi neglected to 
explain his own failure to complete service on the United States on Mathies’ behalf lends 
further weight to the District Court’s conclusion that Mathies had not demonstrated good 
cause, and we therefore perceive no abuse of discretion in that determination. 
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 Notwithstanding Mathies’ failure to demonstrate good cause for failing to 
complete service, the District Court proceeded to determine whether, as a discretionary 
matter, dismissal would be inappropriate.  See Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 
F.3d 1298, 1305 (3d Cir. 1995).  In making that determination, a court is to consider 
several factors, including whether the statute of limitations would foreclose the plaintiff 
from re-filing, whether the defendant attempted to evade service, and any other relevant 
equitable considerations.  See id. at 1305-07.  The District Court noted that the continued 
failure to effect service, which was attributable to both Mathies and his attorney, had 
resulted in an effective six-year tolling of the statute of limitations.  The District Court 
recognized that dismissal would result in Mathies’ inability to re-file because of the two-
year statute of limitations,3
                                                 
3  The statute of limitations for Bivens claims is taken from the state’s personal injury 
statute.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 190 (3d Cir. 1993).  In New Jersey, the 
statute of limitations for personal injury causes of action is two years.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:14-2. 
 but concluded that that factor did not justify continuing the 
action.  In the District Court’s view, it would be unfair to impose upon Dr. Silver further 
delays so that Mathies could complete service, as well as the burden of defending a claim 
that Mathies did not bring to Silver’s attention until -- accepting arguendo Mathies’ 
position that his claim accrued in April 2003 -- seven years after the statute of limitations 
began to run.  Given that “[s]tatutes of limitations serve compelling policy interests,”  
Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 492 (3d Cir. 1992), particularly 
“to protect defendants from the unfair surprise of stale claims,” Kreiger v. United States, 
539 F.2d 317, 322 (3d Cir. 1976), we do not think that the District Court abused its 
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discretion in concluding that fairness to the defendant in this case outweighed Mathies’ 
interest in continuing the litigation. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm.   
